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Chevron Deference: An Empirical Review of
Rigor of Application at the District Court
Level
Bethany Ring
I. INTRODUCTION
During the trial which culminated in his death sentence,
Socrates argued “the unexamined life is not worth living.”1 Perhaps
a parallel wisdom can be derived for judicial realms—perhaps an
unexamined legal doctrine is not worth applying. Just as our vast
body of law has continually transmogrified over time, it may be that
our legal doctrines should be constantly reassessed and adjusted
when and where appropriate. Chevron deference is one such
doctrine worthy of re-evaluation.
The literature is replete with academic examinations of both
Chevron’s supposed wisdom and folly.2 But such speculations
remain simply that: academic. Without actual, empirical
evidence of how the doctrine is being applied by the courts, it is
impossible to know if arguments on either side have been
persuasive to the judges daily called upon to decide when and
how to apply Chevron deference in a case at hand. Having
reviewed and appreciated the several empirical studies
conducted in this area, this Article seeks to expand the
investigation and presents similar findings with respect to
Chevron deference application at the federal district courts—an
unexamined judicial level until this study. This Article takes a
slightly different approach than previous studies as it attempts
 J.D. 2020, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. My deepest
appreciation goes out to my faculty advisors, Professor Anthony Caso and Professor John
Eastman, for their dedication to the Constitutional Jurisprudence Clinic at the Fowler
School of Law. This Article is a by-product of the Clinic as the idea for the research
germinated while drafting several amicus curiae briefs on Chevron-related issues during
my work in the Clinic. I am sincerely grateful for their support and encouragement.
Additionally, I wish to thank my sons, Austin, Zac, and Darren, for their continued
support, as well as my husband Rev. Dr. Robb C. Ring.
1 Socrates, Apology, in ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 88, 102 (Forrest E. Baird & Walter
Kaufman eds., 2003).
2 Throughout this Article, the doctrine of Chevron deference will be repeatedly
referred to simply by the moniker “Chevron.” The underlying case is at times referred to
as “Chevron USA.”
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to examine the rigor with which the courts apply the deference
doctrine—not simply whether the agency prevails under the
application.
A brief account of Chevron’s emergence and rise first serves
to ground the reader in particulars of the doctrine under
scrutiny, including several Athena-istic deference doctrines that
subsequently sprung forth fully-formed from the Zeus-like
Chevron head. Part II recounts various prior empirical studies of
court applications and overlays the accumulated results on
current data to underline the need for a district court level
examination. Part III describes the current study, both in
methodology and result, and finds that at the district court level
there is ample room for improvement in the rigor applied to a
Chevron analysis. Part IV summarizes the research and offers
further possible inquiries in this realm that would serve to
augment not only this current undertaking, but the body of
empirical Chevron studies in general.
A.

Chevron’s Appearance
Chevron deference entered the scene via Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a decision penned by Justice
Stevens in June 1984.3 The case dealt with interpretations of EPA
emissions standards and whether the standards should be construed
narrowly, to every individual building within a refinery complex, or
broadly, such that the emissions should be measured across the
entire complex as a whole.4 Thomas Merrill summed it up well in his
2014 article, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, when he wrote, “Most landmark decisions are born
great—they are understood to be of special significance from the
moment they are decided. But Chevron was little noticed when it was
decided, and came to be regarded as a landmark case only some years
later.”5 This Supreme Court decision, introduced without great
fanfare or full understanding of its future application, indeed came
through the Court quietly without ruffling any feathers or creating
much stir, even in academia. In the year following its publication,
twenty-six law review articles cited the Chevron case.

467 U.S. 837.
Id. at 840.
5 Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 257 (2014). See also FedSoc Films, Chevron:
Accidental
Landmark,
FEDERALIST
SOC’Y
(Dec.
19,
2018),
http://fedsoc.org/commentary/videos/chevron-accidental-landmark [http://perma.cc/B68UMNVQ] (discussing the origins of the Chevron doctrine and how it rose to become an
“accidental landmark”).
3
4
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Of these, seventeen referred to the holding only in footnotes,6 four
gave it a passing mention,7 and one simply compared it to prior court
findings.8 The six remaining articles voiced cautious opinions, hedged
with words such as “may,” “perhaps,” “if,” and “suggests.”9
Nonetheless, the Chevron decision has left a deep and lasting
impression known as Chevron deference—today a well-established
and widely relied upon doctrine.10
Chevron deference, according to the Court, is a two-step
process for judicial review of statutory interpretation by a federal
agency, where the agency is acting within a specified
congressional delegation.11 In Step One, a court determines if
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” in
its authorization of the agency to promulgate the statute.12 If
Congress has been clear, “that is the end of the matter” as “the
court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”13 This investigation of meaning is to be done by
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction.”14 If
ambiguity is found, deference is given to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation at Step Two.15 The interpretation need not be the
best possible reading, or even one well-thought out in light of the
statute’s surrounding wording or legislative purpose, it need only
be reasonable. This deference doctrine has come to be called an
“icon of administrative law.”16
6 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform,
1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 385 n.27 (1985); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 596 n.250 (1985).
7 See, e.g., Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory Reform: The
Legacy of Reagan’s First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REGUL. 293, 306–07 (1985); Andrew Joseph
Siegel, The U.S.-Japanese Whaling Accord: A Result of the Discretionary Loophole in the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 577, 600 (1985).
8 Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505,
549–53 (1985).
9 See, e.g., Stephen M. Lynch, A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency’s
Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
1985 DUKE L.J. 469, 470 (1985) (“In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Supreme Court may have forged the analytic framework for assessing the
validity of an administrative agency’s construction of the statute that it is charged with
administering.”); Eric Redman, Statutory Construction in the Supreme Court: A Northwest
Power Act Example, 15 ENV’T. L. 353, 354 (1985) (“Thus, Chevron is perhaps more likely
than ALCOA to have a lasting impact . . . .”).
10 See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1579 (2006).
11 The requirement that the agency’s actions fall within a scope delineated by
Congress is sometimes referred to as Chevron Step Zero.
12 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
13 Id. at 842–43.
14 Id. at 843 n.9.
15 Id. at 842–44.
16 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 937, 938 (2018).
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B.

Chevron’s Expansion
The distribution of Chevron references, as documented in
Westlaw, is instructive. Figure 1 below summarizes the number
of Chevron USA citations, across all jurisdictions, for each year
from 1984 through 2019.
Figure 1

It is clear from the trend lines on the graph above that a steep
rate of increase in citation occurred between 1984 and 1992.17
Between 1993 and 2004, the same rise was present, but less
pronounced. In 2005, a 38% jump in usage occurred—mostly
reflected at the district court level which experienced a 92%
increase from 2004 to 2005. The overall usage trend since 2005 has
been decreasing. However, the decrease has yet to reach pre-1992
levels.18
C.

Chevron’s Offspring
The invention of Chevron deference opened the door to later
forms of deference. The ensuing deference forms, previously thought
unimaginable, each stood on Chevron—pushing the deference
envelope a bit further. For example, if Chief Justice John Marshall
had ruled on the meaning of a particular statute, and then was told
17 It is noted that the graphic in Figure 1 reflects Chevron USA citations only, not
applications of the Chevron deference two-step test itself.
18 Again, this graphic reflects citations, not deference application. The trends for the
data set studied herein are similar. It is hypothesized that the decreasing post-2005 trend
is due in part to a corresponding increase in application of Chevron deference under
varying pseudonyms.
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that nonetheless, he must defer to a subsequent contrary
interpretation of that statute, chances are he would have been
greatly amused, assumed such a claim was a joke, and reminded us
all of the emphatic duty of the judiciary “to say what the law is.”19
But it is this exact situation, among others, that the Chevron
deference offspring have created. Under Brand X deference, an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute prevails over a
court’s prior contrary interpretation.20 In this same vein, agency
deference is given when ambiguity exists in the meaning of an
agency’s own regulations under Auer deference.21 That is, the
agency solely holds the power to both write and interpret
regulations, directly contrary to a constitutional system which
emphasizes separation of powers. In City of Arlington v. FCC, the
Court extended Chevron deference to questions of agency
jurisdiction, holding that, when a statute is ambiguous on whether
the relevant agency has authority to interpret it, courts must defer
to the agency’s determination that it has such authority.22
D. Recent Rumblings in the Court
The discussion surrounding the prudence of Chevron
deference application has been ongoing for several years, if not
decades. And, in a sort of parallel percolation among academia,
the discussion appears to have risen to a sufficient level to catch
the eye of the Supreme Court. The current conservative makeup
of the Court has helped ripen such notice into comment.
In the Court’s 2019 Kisor v. Wilkie decision, the Court
addressed Auer deference—one of the aforementioned kin of
Chevron.23 The Court in Kisor encouraged a “cabined” approach
to judicial acquiescence, warning that “deference is not the
answer to every question of interpreting an agency’s rules.”24
This warning by the Court should trigger careful investigation
into all judicial deference.
The Court instructed in Kisor that “[f]irst and foremost,”
deference should only be granted when “the regulation is
genuinely ambiguous.”25 And before determining genuine
ambiguity exists, courts “must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’
of construction.”26 Accordingly, under Kisor, all tools of statutory
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005).
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1997).
569 U.S. 290, 296–97 (2013).
139 S.Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (addressing the scope of Auer deference).
Id. at 2408, 2414.
Id. at 2415.
Id.
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interpretation must be utilized when courts attempt to discern
the meaning of an agency’s regulation. The Court thus narrowed
the scope of Auer deference by instructing that courts “must
‘carefully consider[]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose” of
an agency’s regulations since “[d]oing so will resolve many
seeming ambiguities out of the box . . . .”27 This “all tools
exhausted” standard is not a novel concept.28 The Court’s call for
such a standard is appropriately extended to Chevron deference
as well,29 especially since it is reflected in the original wording of
the Chevron USA decision itself.30
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Chevron deference has been in place for just over thirty-five
years and the underlying case has been cited in over 17,000
decisions subsequently, according to the Westlaw database. 31
Figure 2 below depicts the yearly distribution of Chevron case
citations for the main three federal court levels. A complete
evaluation of how and when Chevron deference has been applied
to these thousands of cases would be daunting, to say the least.
Id.
See, e.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In
considering [the statutory] language, we must assure ourselves that we have employed all
‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ . . . .”) (citation omitted); Delek Refin. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 845 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2016) (“We will
consider all the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ before concluding that a
statute is ambiguous.”) (citation omitted); Adams v. Holder, 692 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2012)
(noting Chevron Step Two is only examined if “the statute remains ambiguous despite our
use of all relevant tools of statutory construction . . . .”); Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314
F.3d 875, 880 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ourts do not consider themselves bound by ‘plain
meaning,’ but have recourse to other interpretive tools in an effort to make sense of the
statute.”) (citations omitted); Loving v. I.R.S., 742 F.3d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“In
determining whether a statute is ambiguous and in ultimately determining whether the
agency’s interpretation is permissible or instead is foreclosed by the statute, we must
employ all the tools of statutory interpretation, including ‘text, structure, purpose, and
legislative history.’”) (citations omitted).
29 See also Matthews v. Barr, 927 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s [Esquivel-Quintana] decision reminds courts to use all available tools of statutory
construction . . . before concluding that a statutory term is ambiguous . . . .”); King v.
Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 367 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting “[c]ourts should employ all the
traditional tools of statutory construction” at Chevron Step One); Strickland v. Comm’r,
Me. Dept. of Hum. Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is appropriate to employ all
the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ in the first part of the Chevron analysis
when the statutory language itself is not dispositive.”) (citations omitted).
30 See, e.g., TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 833 F.3d
1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (then-Judge Gorsuch reminding the
bench that simple use of a dictionary can resolve ambiguity); Kent Barnett & Christopher
J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 71–72 (2017) (summarizing
case opinions at the court of appeals level from 2003–2013 and finding “circuit-by-circuit
disparity in . . . invocation of Chevron”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
31 As of April 23, 2021, there were exactly 17,348 cases.
27
28
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Various empirical studies of Chevron deference have been
conducted in the past, but due to the extremely large data set
encountered, each study has chosen a particular focus to produce
a manageable subset. Generally, these studies have focused on
Supreme Court decisions, federal courts of appeal findings, or
subject-specific applications.
Figure 2

A.

Supreme Court Studies
The most noteworthy Supreme Court study was done by
Eskridge and Baer in 2008.32 The study examined Supreme
Court decisions between 1984 and 2005 in which an agency
interpretation of a statute was at issue.33 This criterion produced
a set of 1014 cases which were coded for 156 variables ranging
from basic descriptive information of the key statute to the voting
record for each judge.34 Based on this, Eskridge and Baer
developed a “Continuum of Deference” across Supreme Court
decisions and showed that when Chevron deference was applied,
the agency win rate was 76.2%.35 However, they also concluded
that, as of 2005, “there has not been a Chevron ‘revolution’ at the
Supreme Court level” as Chevron deference had only been
32 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083 (2008).
33 Id. at 1094.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1100.
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applied 8.3% of the time in Supreme Court cases involving
statutory interpretation.36
In an earlier study, Thomas Merrill found it to be “clear that
Chevron is often ignored by the Supreme Court. . . . [as] the two-step
framework has been used . . . only about one-third of the [time].”37
Merrill’s study compared Supreme Court agency win rates for the
three years before Chevron to those in the six years after the Chevron
decision was handed down.38
B.

Appellate Courts Studies
An outstanding 2017 empirical study by Barnett and Walker
examined circuit court opinions from 2003 to 2013 and found
inconsistencies in the circuit courts’ application of Chevron in
general.39 Starting with a data set of 2,272 cases, the study culled
the decisions pulled down to 1,327 relevant opinions.40 Reviewing
these relevant opinions, they discovered circuits differed
significantly in agency-win rates when Chevron was applied, from
88.2% in the Sixth Circuit, to 72.3% in the Ninth Circuit.41 That is,
Barnett and Walker observed that some circuits are simply more
deferential. The study concluded: “The circuit-by-circuit disparity in
the circuit courts’ invocation of Chevron and agency-win rates
reveals that Chevron may not be operating uniformly among the
circuits.”42
Other studies examining circuit court applications have been
done by Kerr43 as well as Schuck and Elliott.44 Kerr looked at
circuit court opinions in 1995–96,45 whereas Schuck and Elliot
focused on D.C. Circuit application for select periods (“1965,
1975, 1984–85, and 1988”).46
C.

Subject-Specific Studies
Some studies only reviewed topic-specific cases. For example,
Miles and Sunstein looked at appellate court decisions from 1990
Id. at 1090.
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
982 (1992).
38 Id. at 980–82.
39 Barnett & Walker, supra note 30, at 1.
40 Id. at 5.
41 Id. at 49.
42 Id. at 71–72.
43 Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Regul. 1 (1998).
44 Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984 (1990).
45 Kerr, supra note 43 at 1.
46 Schuck & Elliott, supra note 44, at 988.
36
37
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through 2004 that involved EPA and NLRB interpretations. 47
They also included a parallel examination of sixty-nine Supreme
Court cases.48 In a study by Revesz, D.C. Circuit cases from 1970
to 1994 were investigated for cases concerning health-and-safety
decisions.49 Along this same line, a 2008 study by Czarnezki
examined environmental law cases in circuit courts over the
three-year period from 2003 to 2005.50
D. Summary of Studies Over Time
In Figure 3 below, the years examined by these past
empirical studies have been overlaid on a graphical depiction of
yearly Chevron USA citations for each judicial level, as originally
shown in Figure 2. Red bars denote examined Supreme Court
cases, dark pink bars indicate years where all circuit court cases
were examined, and light pink bars show time frames during
which a subset of all available cases were investigated. The
individual studies themselves are reflected on Figure 3 as either
solid lines (indicating all cases were examined), or as dashed
lines (indicating a subset of cases were looked at). Figure 3
highlights the lack of investigation done at the district court
level, as well as the limits of studies done at the circuit court
level. The study undertaken herein is depicted as a curved line of
large dashes.

47 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (examining only
EPA and NLRB cases).
48 Id. at 825.
49 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
50 Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking,
Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 767, 767 (2008).

Do Not Delete

622

5/17/2021 9:17 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:3

Figure 3

III. CURRENT STUDY
Upon reviewing the previous empirical studies of Chevron
done to date, the paucity of insight into application at the initial
federal level, i.e., in the district courts, became evident. It is
naturally expected that the appellate court level addresses a
mere fraction of the number of cases passing across the district
court threshold.51 But for a true understanding of the doctrine’s
day-in, day-out application, there is a prudence in examining the
lowest federal judicial tier as well. The studies described in Part
II cover approximately twenty-eight percent of the possible cases
to investigate and, in some instances, overlap. 52 Again, further
empirical study of Chevron application seems timely and useful
as the current Court make-up has signaled a willingness to
wrestle with the underlying wisdom of the doctrine and its scope.

51 See,
e.g.,
Federal
Judicial
Caseload
Statistics
2019,
U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019
[http://perma.cc/8EAU-UV6E].
52 See Figure 3, supra Part II. Twenty-eight percent is derived by assuming the
subject-specific studies constituted examination of half the available cases. In reality, this
number is likely much lower, possibly rendering the percent of cases study to be as low as
nineteen percent.
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A.

Methodology
An examination of only federal district courts reduces the
size of the data set to 7,123 cases. In this study, a catalogue of
basic application of Chevron deference over a broad swath of
cases is presented, rather than a more detailed study on a
smaller case subset.
1. Chevron Citation as Proxy
It is not necessarily true that an opinion which cited to the
underlaying Chevron USA case applied the doctrine of Chevron
deference as well. That is, citation is not expected to be an
accurate proxy for the two-step Chevron application. However,
based on the overall findings in the Barnett and Walker study, it
was estimated the proxy would be accurate approximately 55% to
60% of the time.53
2. Quasi-random Case Selection
Knowing that not all cases selected would apply the Chevron
two-step analysis, this study set out to examine 500 cases,
expecting an ultimate yield of about 275 cases of interest.
Because many of the previous studies were conducted at the
circuit court level, the district courts were first divided into
subsets corresponding with their respective circuit. The circuit
subsets were then divided according to the Westlaw “Depth of
Treatment” designation.54 This was done to capture a
representative number of cases across all levels of discussion. 55
Next, the cases were divided by decade, as reflected in Table 1
below. Using the distribution in Table 1, the 500 cases were
spread out proportionally over the circuit-depth-decade
subcategories. Because cases must be chosen as whole numbers,
numbers were rounded up where appropriate, and 511 total cases
were selected. The individual cases within each subcategory were
chosen randomly.

Barnett & Walker, supra note 30.
See Why you need KeyCite on Thomson Reuters, THOMSON REUTERS,
http://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/why-you-need-keycite.
55 That is, a case which applied Chevron deference in a few brief sentences would be
captured along with cases where the application occupied the majority of the opinion.
53
54
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Table 1

3. Coding
The basic identifying information (caption, citation, date,
court, circuit, etc.) was entered and tracked in an Excel
spreadsheet. Additional variables were entered as each case was
examined. These variables included depth of treatment,
subsequent treatment by the courts of appeals, document type,
case disposition, as well as a count of the number of times the
Chevron USA citation occurred. Each case was examined to see if
a Chevron two-step analysis had been applied. If so, the level of
rigor the court applied at each step was recorded using the
following legend:
0 = no discussion
1 = passing mention
2 = limited discussion
3 = full discussion
This numerical coding allowed the entire dataset to be easily
examined and the results to be represented graphically for
additional clarity.
B.

Results
The convenient coding of results in this study via Excel
spreadsheet enabled the creation of simple graphical illustrations
of the data, as seen throughout the following sections.56 The use
of this format also allowed data to be easily separated into
relevant subsets and corresponding graphs for comparison
purposes.
56 Complete spreadsheet and corresponding graphs are available from the author
upon request.

Do Not Delete

2021]

5/17/2021 9:17 AM

Chevron Deference: An Empirical Review

625

1. Frequency of Application
Out of the 511 cases reviewed, a Chevron analysis was found
to be applied in 252 rulings. This means that for the cases
randomly selected for this study, fifty-one percent contained one
or more references to the underlying Chevron USA opinion but
did not apply the two-step analysis laid out therein. This
percentage is higher than that reflected in the Barnett and
Walker study, but judicial level may account for the difference. 57
This means citation to the Chevron USA case was only an
accurate proxy for application of the Chevron deference doctrine
approximately half of the time—a key factor to be considered in
formulating methodology for future studies. It is not surprising
that the average number of Chevron citations in cases applying
the deference doctrine was greater than those in the compliment
set.58 Interestingly, for the cases applying Chevron, twenty-seven
percent cited to the Chevron USA opinion only once.59
2. Frequency of Deference
This study revealed overall that the district courts grant
deference to agency interpretations with high frequency.
Specifically, the courts found the underlying statute to be
unambiguous twenty-seven percent of the time at Step One of the
Chevron analysis.60 In these cases, Step Two was generally not
considered.61 For the remaining cases where the statute was found
to be ambiguous at Step One, the court deferred to the agency
interpretation at a much higher rate than not. Of all cases where
the deference doctrine was applied, the Step Two analysis found
the agency interpretation to be unreasonable only nine percent of
the time.62 The level of analytical rigor applied by the courts in
coming to these decisions, however, was not constant across the
board and is addressed in the following step-specific sections.
It is noted that in a circuit level review of the data in this
study, the district courts in the D.C. Circuit are most likely to
apply a Chevron analysis (68% application), followed by those in
the Tenth Circuit (66% application). The Eighth and Ninth

57 Barnett & Walker, supra note 30, at 27 (finding 1,327 relevant cases among 2,272
cases studied, a 58.4% rate of application).
58 In cases applying Chevron, the average number of citations was 5 (with a maximum of
139). For cases in which the Chevron USA case was cited but the doctrine was not applied, the
average citation count was 2 (with a maximum value of 39).
59 See Figure 4.
60 Id.
61 In seven percent of the cases, the court went on to evaluate Step Two as well.
62 See Figure 4.
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Circuits are closely tied behind (55% and 56% application,
respectively).
Figure 4

3. Step One Analysis
When the two-step Chevron deference doctrine is applied, Step
One is applied with varying amounts of rigor. Overall, a full
examination of the text to determine the existence of ambiguity was
performed 38.1% of the time, as depicted in Figure 5 below.
However, this number is somewhat misleading as it reflects the
data as whole. Breaking down the cases into sub-categories
reflecting the outcome of the Step One analysis (i.e., ambiguous or
unambiguous), it was found that a full analysis is applied 50% of
the time in unambiguous findings, but much less—only 33.7% of the
time—when ambiguity is discovered. Figure 6 reflects the complete
range of levels of discussion in these two sub-categories. It is noted
that, in Figure 6, a “passing mention” level of analysis when a
statute was found unambiguous was usually a simple cite to prior
or sister court precedent.
The discrepancy in application of a “full discussion” level of
analysis between ambiguous and unambiguous findings, as reflected
in Figure 6, begs the question of whether this result is a cause or an
effect. That is, do courts include a deeper, more robust discussion
when they are seeking to justify a finding of unambiguity? Or does a
deeper, more robust discussion more frequently lead to a finding of
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unambiguity? Absent insight into the minds of the individual judges
behind these opinions, this query cannot be answered from the data
gathered in this study, but it posits an interesting question worthy of
further examination.
Figure 5

Figure 6

Overall, the levels of discussion at Step One in Figure 5 across
the sampling of district court cases in this study, at first glance,
seem heartening. Taken together, a limited or full discussion was
applied in 57.5% of the cases.63 This number would appear to
63

See Figure 5.
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bolster claims that the district courts are dutiful in applying
appropriate rigor at Step One. However, it is disturbing to see that
29.4% of the time, the courts give Step One analysis no more than a
passing mention.64 It is even more disturbing that in 13.1% of cases,
no discussion of Step One was included in a Chevron analysis.65
These numbers underline the need seen by the Supreme Court in
Kisor to emphasize the requirement to exhaust all the traditional
tools of construction in determining if genuine ambiguity exists—a
standard the district courts are failing to faithfully meet.
4. Step Two Analysis
Having determined there is an ambiguity present, the courts
next consider at Step Two whether the agency’s interpretation was
reasonable. As seen in Figure 7, this study found a full discussion
of the question was afforded 44.6% of the time across the board.
But again, a discrepancy is seen when the data is sub-divided by
result, i.e., by whether or not deference is ultimately given to the
agency interpretation.66
Much like the question posed in the Step One results above,
there is a question of cause and effect presented in the Step Two
results. Remembering that weighted percentages must be applied
to the graphs in Figure 8 in order to produce the graph in Figure
7, it is somewhat striking to see that a full discussion occurs
56.5% of the time when no deference is given, as opposed to only
in 42.9% of the cases where deference is granted. Is the higher
percent of full discussion given as a justification for finding no
deference is warranted? Or is a higher level of discussion more
likely to lead to a denial of deference? These cause-and-effect
questions were not anticipated at the outset of this study, and
therefore, the study did not collect variables sufficient to address
such inquiries.

64
65
66

Id.
Id.
See Figure 8.
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Figure 7

Figure 8

Again, it is initially encouraging to see the relatively high
frequency of full discussion reflected in Figure 7. Nonetheless, it
seems counterintuitive that a Step Two analysis would ever be given
no discussion or a simple passing mention, much less that such
would occur 37.5% of the time.67 The district courts clearly have
ample room for improvement in this area.
67

3.3% (no discussion) + 34.2% (passing mention) = 37.5%.
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5. Circuit Comparisons
The results presented above can also be viewed on a
circuit-by-circuit basis since each district court decision in the
study was coded to identify its parent circuit. This introduces a
refinement to the levels of discussion given for Steps One and
Two above. In Figures 9 and 10 below, each circuit is presented
as a bar with the varying levels of discussion reflected in the
same colors used in Figures 5 through 8 above. Each bar reflects
100% of the data gathered at the circuit level and therefore, the
colors reflect the percentage of application at each level, not
actual numbers of cases in each category. According to Figure 9,
the Eleventh Circuit applies a full discussion at Step One most
often, followed closely by the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit result, however, may be tempered by the
fact that the “limited discussion” category is not reflected at all,
and may be further exacerbated by the small number of cases
studied for the Eleventh Circuit (17 cases total, as compared to
49 cases and 47 cases at the Ninth and D.C. Circuits,
respectively). The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, seems to be most
willingly to give no discussion or a passingly mention in a
Chevron Step One analysis.
Figure 9
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At Step Two, reflected in Figure 10 below, the First Circuit is
most likely to apply a full discussion, followed by the D.C. Circuit
and a tie between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. But again, the
percentages are impacted by the small sample size at the First
Circuit level—only nine cases falling in the First Circuit were
studied.
Figure 10

IV. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER POSSIBLE INQUIRIES
This research seeks to fill an empirical study void by
examining district court applications of the Chevron deference
doctrine. The study found that for cases which apply the two-step
analysis, the levels of rigor with which each step is applied varies
significantly within the district courts themselves, from no
discussion to full discussion, and equally varies among the
respective circuit court groupings. Overall, there exists among
the district courts a 38.1% full discussion application of Step
One68 and a 44.6% full discussion application at Step Two.69 The
failure of the courts to be more rigorous in Chevron application
via full discussion suggests there may be merit to past academic

68
69

See Figure 5.
See Figure 7.
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claims that the courts have wide room for improvement with
respect to this doctrine.
Such claims have not been limited to academia. In his
dissent in TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Administrative Review
Board, United States Department of Labor, then-Judge Gorsuch
pointedly reminded the court that “there are countless cases
finding a statute unambiguous after examining the dictionary.” 70
Similarly, Justice Kavanaugh, while he was on the D.C. Circuit
bench, observed variation in Chevron application among lower
courts and noted that “judges’ personal views are infecting these
kinds of cases” where judges “have wildly different conceptions of
whether a particular statute is clear or ambiguous.”71 Indeed,
this disparity in rigorous application has prompted the Court to
warn that “a court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it
found the regulation impenetrable on first read.”72 Justice Scalia
has noted that sometimes “interpretation requires a taxing
inquiry” and “Chevron is . . . not a declaration that, when
statutory construction becomes difficult, we will throw up our
hands and let regulatory agencies do it for us.”73 Although this
“taxing inquiry” may not be omitted on account of its onerous
nature, this study, alongside results from prior studies, suggests
courts appear to be doing just that.
In the future, the current study would be well served to be
expanded to generate a greater sample size. Additionally, several
supplementary lines of inquiry have been proposed above in Part III;
although as presented, as cause versus effect inquiries, the study
methodology would need to be significantly adjusted. Alternatively,
updates of some of the prior studies presented in Part II would offer
interesting insight, particularly on how the Chevron deference doctrine
has weathered the last seven years at the circuit court level and the
last fifteen years in the Supreme Court. Such expansions of the
Barnett and Walker, and Eskridge and Baer studies, respectively, are
still feasible at this point—albeit time-consuming—and the author
strongly encourages the undertaking of these extensions to further
general understanding of Chevron deference and how it has been and
is currently being applied by the federal courts at all levels.74

833 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2142, 2152 (2016).
72 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).
73 Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74 In the author’s opinion, either update would be reasonable to accomplish with a
suitable team of assistants.
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